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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLEVE C. CHILD, EAEL L. 
BOWEN, ENOCH LUDLOW and J. 
LEE BUTLER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF SPANISH FORK, 
a Municipal Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action whereby the plaintiffs, owners of 
certain real property located in Utah County, are seek-
ing to compel defendant, the City of Spanish Fork, to 
proceed to complete annexation of an area known as 
"Wolf Hollow" without being required to comply with 
a precondition thereof, namely the transfer of two 
acre feet of Strawberry Valley water or its equivalent, 
without cost, to Spanish Fork City for each acre of land 
proposed to be annexed. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Fourth Judicial District Court, the Hon-
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tion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The 
court ruled that there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law; accordingly, plaintiff's com-
plaint was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
(R.7.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks the court to affirm the aforesaid 
summary judgment entered by the district court. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 4, 1971, and June 15, 1972, plain-
tiffs presented petitions to the City Council of Spanish 
Fork City pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953) 
requesting annexation of certain territory commonly re-
ferred to as "Wolf Hollow." (R. 9.) On or about 
February 15, 1973, in a regular meeting of the said city 
council, a resolution was passed approving the Wolf 
Hollow annexation subject to several conditions, one of 
which was the "transfer of irrigation water to the city." 
(R. 9-10; 51A.) On or about April 19, 1973, the propo-
nents of the "Wolf Hollow" annexation met again with 
the city council at which time the transfer of irrigation 
water was again discussed. (R. 39.) At this time the 
proponents were clearly informed that before Spanish 
Fork City would accept the Wolf Hollow annexation, the 
landowners would be required to transfer to the city with-
out cost, two acre feet of Strawberry Valley water or its 
equivalent for each acre of land to be annexed. (R. 44.) 
2 
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It was further explained that this policy had been fol-
lowed in the past and that they would be expected to 
follow it also. (R. 44-45; 46-47.) When this matter was 
heard by the district court on or about October 18, 1974, 
the plaintiffs admitted noncompliance with the above 
condition in that they had not transferred any irrigation 
water to Spanish Fork City. (R. 10.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY ENTER-
ED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN RESPOND-
ENT'S FAVOR. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the instant 
case is governed by this court's decision in Bradshaw 
v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972). 
In Beaver City, the court was asked to set aside an an-
nexation ordinance passed by the city council subject to 
certain conditions that the landowners had to fulfill be-
fore the annexation would be complete. City taxpayers 
argued against the annexation, stating that by passing 
the ordinance subject to such conditions the city council 
had effectively left the ultimate determination up to 
the landowners, since the landowners could refrain from 
fulfilling the conditions and thus defeat the annexation. 
On the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits filed 
in the case, the lower court granted defendants' motion 
for summary judgment and plaintiffs appealed. On ap-
peal, this court identified the "pivotal issue" in the case 
as "whether the annexation of the area in question to 
3 
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Beaver City constitutes an unlawful act of the city coun-
cil." 493 P.2d at 644. The court then cited the trial 
court with approval: 
The court finds that even if the facts set forth in 
f
 the first cause of action were determined to be 
true, it would be outside the scope of authority 
of this court to make a ruling or determination on 
matters that are within the discretion of the leg-
islative authorities and mayor of Beaver City. 
493 P.2d at 645. 
In order to clearly define the scope of judicial re-
view in disputed annexation cases, this court then estab-
lished the following test: 
The determination of the boundaries of a city 
and what may or may not be encompassed therein, 
including annexation or severance, is a legisla-
tive function to be performed by the governing 
body of the city. The courts are and should be 
reluctant to intrude into the prerogative of the 
legislative branch of government, and will inter-
fere with such action only if it plainly appears 
that it is so lacking in propriety and reason that 
it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, or is 
in excess of the authority of the legislative body. 
493 P.2d at 645 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
Respondent submits that when the instant case is 
judged according to the standard applied in Beaver City, 
it will be clear that summary judgment was properly 
entered. In the first place, an examination of the plead-
ings and affidavits in the record demonstrates that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists in this case. Ap-
pellants failed to plead compliance with the disputed 
4 
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condition of annexation in their complaint (R. 48-50; R. 
40), and later asserted that compliance was immaterial. 
(R. 35.) Appellants further admitted in Point V of their 
memorandum that : 
However, at this point, it is not material whether 
the condition arose from the ordinance, from res-
olution, or from whatever other source. It is 
instead a determination of the reasonableness of 
that condition, considered in light of the evidence 
and surrounding circumstances, that is being 
sought by plaintiffs in their action. It is there-
fore only material here for this court to decide 
whether or not plaintiffs' Complaint, seeking such 
determination, is sufficient on its face. (R. 11; 
R, 36-37.) 
Thus the only question remaining for the lower court 
to decide was the reasonableness of the disputed con-
dition. 
In his minute entry explaining his ruling, Judge 
Ballif cited this court's decision in Beaver City as con-
trolling the reasonableness issue. (R. 11.) He then ruled 
that the condition was reasonable for the following 
reasons: 
The extension of municipal facilities to new ter-
ritory requiring servicing by water, power, sewer, 
roads, etc. would reasonably require that the leg-
islative body provide that resources within the 
projected area needed to assist in providing the 
municipal facilities be transferred without com-
pensation to the municipality if annexation is to 
be allowed. To hold otherwise would make an-
nexation a matter of right by simply meeting the 
statutory requirement and could force a dilution 
of municipal services, and increased tax burden 
to the citizens of the municipality without allow-
5 
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ing them the right to make provision for the 
servicing of additional territory. All of these con-
siderations would lead to the conclusion that there 
is no taking of private property without compen-
sation, but the consent of a municipality to in-
clude an area only upon condition that needed 
resources available such as water be given to the 
municipality for the privilege of gaining such 
services from the municipality. (R. 11-12.) 
In Beaver City, this court stated that it will only 
interfere with legislative action on annexation matters 
when it plainly appears that it is either (1) capricious 
and arbitrary, or (2) in excess of legislative authority. 
493 P.2d at 645. As Judge Ballif's opinion demon-
strates, this showing has not been made. On the con-
trary, it is apparent that Spanish Fork City recognized 
and followed the statutory procedure for annexation as 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953). (See R. at 
40.) It is further evident that the city refused to com-
plete the procedure only when it became evident that 
the property owners were not going to comply with a 
condition designed solely to provide needed resources 
for the area without forcing a dilution of municipal serv-
ices or an increased tax burden on resident citizens. Such 
a condition falls far short of the " arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard required before the courts will inter-
fere in an essential legislative function. The lower court 
should therefore be affirmed. 
€ 
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POINT II 
IMPOSING A REQUIREMENT THAT 
NEEDED WATER RESOURCES BE TRANS-
FERRED TO THE CITY AS A CONDITION 
OF ANNEXATION CONSTITUTES A LE-
GITIMATE EXERCISE OF THE CITY'S 
DELEGATED POWER TO ACT IN SUCH 
MATTERS. 
The issue presented by Point I of appellants' brief 
is whether respondent city exceeded its statutory au-
thority by attempting to obtain water sources for a pro-
posed annexation other than by purchase, lease, or con-
demnation. 
A. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953). 
The procedure for annexation of land which is con-
tiguous to an existing boundary of a municipality is 
found in Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953). Basically, the 
requirements are as follows: 
a. Petition for annexation by a majority of the 
landowners of the land which will be included in the 
annexation. This must include the owners of at least 
one-third of the value of the land. 
b. Preparation of a map or plat of the proposed 
annexation. 
c. Approval of the annexation by at least two-
thirds of the members of the city council. 
d. Preparation and passage of an ordinance an-
nexing the portion of land to the city. 
7 
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e. Recordation of both a certified copy of the an-
nexation ordinance and the plat with the office of the 
county recorder. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that a determination of city boundaries is essentially a 
legislative function, to be performed by the governing 
body of the city or town. See Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 
493 P.2d 643, discussed supra. Although the power to 
initiate the formal annexation procedure rests with the 
owners of contiguous land, there is a clear legislative 
intent, supported by this court, that the ultimate deter-
mination is to be made by the governing body of the 
municipality. This court is obviously reluctant to inter-
fere with the decisions of such a body, and will do so 
only when the actions and decisions of that body consti-
tute an abuse of discretion. 
It is further clear that a city or town may impose 
reasonable costs or duties on landowners as a condition 
of annexation under this statute. In the Beaver City 
case, for example, the city council imposed certain con-
ditions on annexation including installation of water 
lines and preparation of certain portions of the prop-
erty for paving. With respect to these conditions, the 
court stated: 
The actual authorization for the annexation was 
made by the City Council, and there is no reason 
that we know of why it was not proper ami, within 
its prerogative to prescribe reasonable conditions 
in connection with the annexation. 493 P.2d at 645 
(emphasis added). 
8 
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In the instant case, the Spanish Fork City Council 
has recognized and followed the statutory procedure for 
annexation. In the property does not meet certain stand-
ards, or if the proponents of the annexation do not meet 
or comply with the conditions previously imposed by the 
city council, or if the proposed annexation will jeop-
ardize city services for residents of the city, or if the 
proposed annexation will be costly or burdensome for 
the city, then the city council may refuse to complete 
the annexation procedure until the incoming landowners 
fulfill certain reasonable conditions thereof. Imposition 
of such conditions is well within the council's legislative 
prerogative under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1 (1953) as in-
terpreted by this court. 
B. Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4(1953). 
Appellants further argue, however, that the coun-
cil's action contravenes Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 (1953) 
governing the acquisition of municipal water sources. 
Appellants precise contention is that unless a city uses 
the means of purchase, lease or condemnation as set 
forth in this section to obtain water supplies, it commits 
an ultra vires act. 
Appellants' argument is erroneous for several rea-
sons. The first is that Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 is not 
the only statute governing acquisition of water supplies 
by municipalities as appellants suggest. (Brief of Ap-
pellants at 6.) The court's attention is directed to Utah 
Code Ann. §10-8-18 (1953), for example, which also deals 
directly with the acquisition of water sources by cities 
and towns. 
9 
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More importantly, however, appellants' argument 
simply ignores that part of the statute which expressly 
empowers cities to use means other than purchase, lease, 
or condemnation to obtain water supplies. The exact 
statutory language is as follows: 
The board of commissioners, city council or board 
of trustees of any city or town may acquire, pur-
chase or lease all or any part of any wrater, water 
works system, water supply or property connected 
therewith, and whenever the governing body of 
a city or town shall deem it necessary for the 
public good such city or town may bring condem-
nation proceedings to acquire the same; . . . Utah 
Code Ann. §10-7-4 (1953) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. §10-8-18 similarly provides: 
[The boards of commissioners and city councils 
of cities] may construct, purchase or lease and 
maintain canals, ditches, artesian wells and res-
ervoirs, may appropriate, purchase or lease 
springs, stream or sources of water supply for 
the purpose of providing water for irrigation, 
domestic or other useful purposes; may prevent 
all waste or water flowing from artesian wells, 
^ and if necessary to secure sources of water sup-
ply, may purchase or lease land; they may also 
purchase, acquire or lease stock in canal com-
,
 s panies for the purpose of providing water for the 
city and the inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis 
added.) 
As is evident from the express statutory language 
cited above, the legislature did not intend to limit muni-
cipalities to the means of purchase, lease or condemna-
tion in obtaining water supplies. On the contrary, the 
legal definition of the term "acquire" includes pur-
10 
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chase, lease, condemnation, and much more. Indeed, 
"acquire" is defined as "to gain by any [lawful] means 
. . . or in whatever manner." Black's Law Dictionary 
(rev. 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis added). Furthermore, 
this broad view regarding the legitimate means of ac-
quisition of municipal water sources was recognized in 
Utah case law as early as 1891 and has been followed 
to this day. City of Springville v. Fullmer
 f 7 Utah 450, 
27 P. 577 (1891). Thus from a strictly legal viewpoint, 
respondent city's chosen means of obtaining water sup-
plies for the proposed annexation is legitimate under 
both Utah Code Ann. §10-7-4 and Utah Code Ann. 
§10-8-18. 
Carrying appellants' argument to its logical con-
clusion also presents practical problems of great signifi-
cance. By limiting municipalities to the means of pur-
chase, lease, or condemnation only, appellants would nec-
essarily foreclose all other means of obtaining water 
supplies including gift, adverse possession, and prescrip-
tive easement. Such a result would have a dramatic ad-
verse effect on municipal powers which is not warranted 
by the enabling statutes. Such a result would also con-
travene Utah precedent which has recognized the right 
of a municipality to acquire water rights by adverse 
possession. City of Springville, 27 P. at 577-78. 
Finally, in attempting to establish their unrealistic-
ally limited theory of municipal powers, appellants have 
failed to cite a single authority which is directly in point. 
Thus Rithole v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 384 
P.2d 702 (1955); Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343, 
11 
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502 P.2d 557 (1972); Sanchez
 v. City of Santa Fe, 82 
N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); King v. Alaska State 
Housing Authority, 512 P.2d 887 (Ala. 1973); Town of 
Sheridan v. Valley Sanitation District, 137 Colo. 315, 
324 P.2d 1038 (1958); State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone 
Co. v. City of Sheboygan, 111 Wis. 23, 86 N.W. 657 
(1901); and Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. City of Milwau-
kee, 223 Wis. 251, 270 N.W. 336 (1936), are all readily 
distinguishable on the grounds that none deals with a 
city's power to annex contiguous territory or obtain 
water supplies under the relevant Utah enabling stat-
utes which must be applied in this case. Furthermore, 
respondent city agrees with the general proposition for 
which the cases are cited, namely that a city may not 
exceed its delegated power to act under specific enabling 
statutes. Rather than demonstrating how respondent 
has exceeded its authority under the relevant Utah stat-
utes, however, appellants have been content to rely upon 
generalized statements of law applied to distinguishable 
factual situations arising under irrelevant enabling stat-
utes. In contrast, respondent has demonstrated how and 
why it has not exceeded its delegated authority under 
the applicable Utah statutes as applied to the facts of 
this case. 
Respondent respectfully submits that imposing a 
condition for annexation which would require the trans-
fer of needed irrigation water to the city is a legitimate 
exercise of the city's power to acquire water sources 
under Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1, §10-7-4, and §10-8-18 as 
well as the Utah cases interpreting these statutes. The 
lower court should therefore be affirmed on this point. 
12 
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POINT III 
THE CONDITION REQUIRING A TRANS-
FER OF IRRIGATION WATER TO THE 
CITY PRIOR TO ANNEXATION DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A TAKING OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION. 
The issue raised in Point II of appellants' brief is 
whether a condition requiring transfer of irrigation 
water to respondent city prior to annexation constitutes 
a taking of private property without compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
Appellants cite several cases as authority for the 
general proposition that government cannot seek to ob-
tain compliance with an unconstitutional demand by 
establishing that unconstitutional demand as a precon-
dition to the exercise of discretionary power. See Frost 
v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Bynum 
v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); State v. 
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968). 
(Brief of Appellants at 11-12.) Respondent agrees. How-
ever, appellants fail to cite a single case in support of 
their argument that a condition for annexation requir-
ing transfer of water shares to the city amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking. Instead, the only basis for ap-
pellants ' position is the unsupported conclusory state-
ment that requiring the proponents of annexation to 
transfer water shares or the money equivalent to the city 
is "by definition" a "classical example of a taking of 
private property rights by a government body." (Brief 
of Appellants at 11.) 
13 
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Respondent submits that appellants' unsupported 
conclusion is oversimplified and contrary to the law. 
See e.g., 56 Am. Jur.2d Municipal Corporations §60 
(1971); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 1335, 1360 (1929). As these 
authorities indicate, the test to be applied to this ques-
tion is essentially the same as applied in Beaver City, 
i.e., whether the condition of annexation is reasonable. 
And as Judge Ballif pointed out in applying this test, 
the city's requirement is not a taking at all, but rather 
a means of providing the additional resources necessary 
to properly serve the Wolf Hollow area without forcing 
a dilution of municipal services or an increased tax 
burden on present city residents. (R. 11-12.) Such 
grounds clearly fall short of the " arbitrary or capri-
cious" standard required to justify intervention by the 
courts. Furthermore, appellants do not even claim that 
the amount of additional water required by the city 
exceeds the area's needs. Since the required amount is 
uncontested, it certainly seems reasonable for the city 
to require the landowners in the area, presumably those 
who stand to benefit most by an extension of municipal 
services, to provide the needed resources before the city 
becomes obligated to extend such services. 
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court properly 
ruled that the condition at issue does not constitute an 
unconstitutional taking of private property without just 
compensation. 
14 
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POINT IV 
THE CONDITION REQUIRING A TRANS-
FER OF IRRIGATION WATER TO THE 
CITY PRIOR TO ANNEXATION DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PRO-
TECTION. 
The issue raised in Point III of appellants' brief is 
essentially the same one raised in Point II, namely, 
wrhether the required transfer of irrigation water to the 
city as a precondition of annexation is reasonable. Ap-
pellants further assert, however, that the imposed con-
dition creates an " inherent inequality among the plain-
tiffs, the minority owners within the territory to be 
annexed, and the present inhabitants of the city" which 
creates a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Brief of 
Appellants at 16.) 
Because municipal corporations enjoy broad legis-
lative powers, the courts will not invalidate a municipal-
ity's legislative acts unless the complaining party can 
present substantial evidence that it has exceeded its 
federal and state constitution limitations or abused its 
discretion by acting in an arbitrary, discriminatory, ca-
pricious, or unreasonable manner. State ex rel. Holi-
field v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 108 
So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 817 
(1959); 1 J. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law §4.12, 
at 206 (1968); 2 E. McQuillan, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations §10.33, at 823-25 (3rd ed. rev. 1966); Com-
ment, 1971 Utah L. Eev. 397. Where the plaintiffs al-
lege that the municipality has exceeded its constitutional 
limitations by denying the the equal protection of the 
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laws, the courts apply one of two established tests to 
determine the validity of the municipality's act. See 
Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1065 (1969). These tests are the "traditional" 
or "classical" test and the "strict review" test. Since 
it is uncontested that no suspect classification such as 
race or fundamental interest such as voting is involved 
in the instant case, the traditional test is the proper 
standard to be applied. Under this test, the govern-
mental classification is presumed to be reasonable unless 
the complaining party shows it to be arbitrary. If, how-
ever, there is a rational connection between the classifi-
cation and a proper governmental objective, the classifi-
cation will be upheld. Raihvay Express Agency, Inc. v. 
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
A. Proponents vs. Dissenting Property Owners 
Appellants attack two classifications allegedly im-
posed by the condition. The first is that which allegedly 
differentiates between plaintiffs, proponents of annex-
ation, and the dissenting, minority property owners. 
(Brief of Appellants at 15.) Appellants' argument 
seems to be that requiring the proponents of annexa-
tion to convey water shares for the entire area consti-
tutes an arbitrary and capricious act. (Brief of Ap-
pellants at 14-16.) 
Upon analysis, it becomes readily apparent that the 
alleged discriminatory classification between majority 
and minority property owners in the Wolf Hollow area 
is without foundation in fact. The condition imposed in 
this matter is simply the "transfer of irrigation water 
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to the city" by the "owners of property" in the area. 
(R. 51A; 54.) It is not the "transfer of irrigation water 
to the city by the majority landowners only" as appel-
lants seem to suggest. The city's only concern is that 
the additional water is provided before annexation is 
completed; it is not concerned with who provides it. 
But even assuming arguendo that a "classification" 
had been made, it seems evident that a rational basis 
for this "classification" would exist. In the first place, 
it is uncontroverted that the amount of water required 
to be transferred to the city will be necessary to ade-
quately service the entire Wolf Hollow area, Secondly, 
since appellants are the majority landowners who peti-
tioned for annexation in the first place, and who will 
presumably stand to benefit most from subsequent de-
velopment of the area, it seems obvious that they con-
stitute the group most likely to fulfill the conditions 
imposed. Thus the city's objective of acquiring adequate 
water resources to service the entire annexation area 
would most easily and most probably be achieved, at 
the lowest cost, by imposing the condition on those most 
interested in and most likely to benefit from the pro-
posal. Such grounds fall far short of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard required by the courts. 
B. Proponents vs. City Residents 
Appellants' second objectionable classification is 
that which allegedly differentiates between the pro-
ponents of annexation and present city inhabitants. 
(Brief of Appellants at 16.) There are, however, sev-
eral rational bases which support this classification. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the first place, it is important to note the in-
herent distinction which always exists between city res-
idents, already enjoying the benefits and bearing the 
burdens of city living, and noncity residents attempting 
to obtain an expansion of municipal services. Such an 
expansion of city services necessarily results in addi-
tional costs which must be met either by requiring the 
transfer of needed resources as a precondition of an-
nexation, or by penalizing city residents by diluting 
existing services or increasing their tax burden. In this 
regard it is no answer to claim that the city could avoid 
all financial burden on its inhabitants by simply issuing 
bonds to pay for the water under Utah Code Ann. §10-7-7 
through §10-7-10 (1953), since it ignores very real prob-
lems such as statutory debt ceilings, bond issue election 
expense, sinking fund and interest expense, and the 
substantial possibility that the electors would defeat 
the bond issue proposal. Furthermore, as Judge Ballif 
pointed out in his minute entry, to adopt appellants' 
theory would make annexation a matter of right by 
simply meeting the statutory petition requirement with-
out consideration of the additional burden thereby im-
posed on existing residents. (E. 11-12.) Under appel-
lants' view, however, Utah municipalities would be forced 
to accept annexation petitions regardless of whatever 
burden may be imposed on city residents to provide 
water or other resources for the annexed territory. For 
these reasons, it is evident that the city acted rationally, 
indeed prudently, in requiring the landowners in the 
area to provide needed water resources before complet-
ing annexation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment entered by the lower court 
in respondent's favor should be affirmed for the follow-
ing reasons: 
1. It is uncontroverted that no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact exists between the parties. 
2. The condition requiring a transfer of irrigation 
water to the City of Spanish Fork prior to annexation 
of the Wolf Hollow acreage is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. 
3. The condition requiring a transfer of irrigation 
water to the city prior to annexation does not constitute: 
a, an ultra vires act under the relevant Utah 
enabling statutes; 
b. a taking of private property without compen-
sation ; or 
c. a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
G. Richard Hill 
HANSEN & ORTON 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2020 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
